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Innovation is often uncritically seen as a good thing (Rogers 1976) and considered as a panacea 
for all kinds of socio-economic challenges (Blok and Lemmens 2015). At the same time, the 
concept of innovation itself remains undefined in most policy documents, while its meaning 
seems to be taken for granted in the scientific literature (Godin 2015). We are familiar for 
instance with dichotomies like incremental versus disruptive innovation (Christensen 1997) 
or closed versus open innovation (Chesbrough 2003, 2006), but what does the notion of inno-
vation itself mean? While it is nowadays often understood as the commercialization of tech-
nological inventions (von Schomberg and Blok 2018), new developments like the emergence 
of social, sustainable and responsible innovation make this self-evident conceptualization 
questionable. If we do not confront this self-evident understanding of innovation, as it is found 
in economics, innovation studies and business administration, the conceptualization of these 
new developments remain hemmed in by traditional innovation philosophies.
One would expect that the philosophical tradition can provide guidance in our understand-
ing of innovation, as philosophers traditionally reflect on basic concepts and categories that 
structure our understanding of the world, such as nature versus technology, humans versus 
non-humans and so on. It is striking, however, that the notion of innovation is not among 
the key concepts that traditional philosophers tend to reflect upon (Blok 2020, 2021). One 
reason might be that philosophers originally tend to understand and gain knowledge of the 
world around us, rather than to change or innovate it. Further, the object of philosophical 
knowledge is traditionally found beyond the world of becoming in which innovations take 
place, and aims at knowledge about the non-changing or universal categories that underlie this 
world of becoming, for instance knowledge about the Platonic ideas or the Kantian categories. 
Finally, to the extent that the primary objective of philosophical knowledge is to understand 
the world, traditional philosophers may have the tendency to conform themselves to the world 
as it is, rather than changing or revolutionizing it. Nonetheless, to the extent that philosophical 
reflection can contribute to the critical assessment of basic concepts, and innovation is one of 
the concepts that mark our time, we take a step back in this chapter and philosophically reflect 
on the notion of innovation. Such a philosophy of innovation enables us to critically reflect 
on the self-evidence of the techno-economic paradigm of innovation and its applicability on 
contemporary phenomena like social and sustainable innovation.
In order to open up the phenomenon of innovation, we distinguish between the innovation 
process and outcome dimension, and between the ontic and ontological dimension of innova-
tion (section 1). The ontic dimension of innovation concerns beings like new artefacts, and 
the ontological dimension concerns the being of these beings. These distinctions lead to four 
characteristics of our understanding of innovation with several implications for the object of 
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innovation and its novelty, as well as for the temporality and human involvement in innovation 
practices. It will turn out that innovation concerns the ontogenetic process in which primarily 
a world is constituted – that is, the digital world – in which the invention of new artefacts – that 
is, blockchain technology – is embedded.1 This ontogenetic process doesn’t follow a chrono-
logical temporal order, but is constituted by a temporal iterative process. Human creativity is 
involved in this ontogenetic process as co-creative capacity (section 2). In section 3, we show 
the advantage of our conceptualization of innovation and its implications for contemporary 
and future alternative theories of innovation.
PHILOSOPHY OF INNOVATION2
In this section, we subsequently discuss (a) the innovation process and outcome dimension, 
and (b) the ontic and ontological dimension of innovation, which leads to four characteristics 
of the phenomenon of innovation.
(a) The Process and Outcome Dimension of Innovation
A first characteristic of innovation can be found if we oppose the innovation process to the 
outcome of the process. The word innovation has both a substantive meaning, for example the 
iPhone as an outcome or end-product – and a verbal meaning – the innovation process that 
results in the iPhone as outcome. On the one hand, this innovation outcome may be considered 
as something new to the world, for instance the first time Apple introduced the iPhone as an 
outcome or end-product of the innovation process. On the other hand, the creation of this new 
end-product will replace predecessors of the smartphone, for instance the dominance of lan-
dlines in Western households. Because innovation is not only an outcome but also a process, 
it is something that can and should be managed. Stage gate models (Cooper 2008) and tech-
nology readiness levels of innovation for instance enable the management of this innovation 
process in such a way that it leads to the best possible outcomes.
In economic thinking, the process of innovation is often understood in terms of a creative 
destruction; the innovation of the diesel engine in locomotives for instance is not only the 
creation of a new end-product that can be exchanged on the market, but destructed at the 
same time the existing industry in steam engines, just like the innovation of the compact disc 
destructed the industry of cassette tapes and LPs and is now replaced by streaming services 
(Schumpeter 1943; Blok 2020). But we do not have to refer to Schumpeter’s concept of 
creative destruction to understand the dynamic process of creation and destruction involved 
in the innovation process. The history of the concept of innovation shows that it always 
appeared in the context of a dominant “paradigm of orthodoxy, authority and order” (Godin 
2015, p. 93). Innovations involve something new that intervenes within the established order. 
Plato for instance introduces the concept of innovation in the context of the political order. He 
argues against innovation because it introduces change that threatens the established political 
order (Plato 1967; Aristotle 1944; Blok 2020). How do we have to understand this dynamic 
innovation process that creates something new and at the same time threatens to undermine or 
destruct the existing order?
If we consider the outcome of the innovation process as a concrete individual object or 
artefact, the innovation process itself can be formally conceived as the pre-individual. This 
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reality of the innovation process before its individuation in a concrete innovation outcome 
can be conceptualized as the ontogenesis of this outcome. Ontogenesis originally refers to the 
developmental processes and conditions for the development of an individual organism, from 
the time of fertilization to its mature form, but can be found in the development of innovations 
as well. The reality of the ontogenetic process of innovation cannot be understood out of its 
outcome, like incremental and radical innovation, or closed and open innovation, because then 
the process of innovation is conceptualized based on its outcome, that is, the pre-individual 
is understood in terms of the individual that comes out of it and not out of this process itself. 
Precisely this is the problem with many typologies of innovation in the innovation manage-
ment literature. Although the process of innovation is theorized since the 1920s in disciplines 
like anthropology and sociology, distinctions like incremental versus radical innovation 
(Freeman and Soete 1997) or architectural versus modular innovations (Henderson and Clark 
1990) characterize different types of innovations but miss its ontogenetic process. On the 
contrary, the outcomes of the innovation process – concrete individual products or services, 
its components or the compositions of these components – are taken as point of departure. 
This focus on the innovation outcome may be explained by what is called the ‘culture of 
things’ or material culture: “The origin of this culture goes back to the Renaissance: due to 
commercial exchanges, exploration and travel, natural and artificial objects have been what is 
valued in arts, science, and real life” (Godin 2008, p. 21). But if innovation concerns both the 
process and the outcome of the process, a philosophical reflection can no longer be isolated to 
outcomes, but must come to terms with the process that is a distinct and integral part of inno-
vation. On the one hand, if we find the point of departure of our reflections in the outcome of 
the innovation process – that is, the artefact as outcome of innovation – we miss the operation 
that is constituting this innovative outcome, we miss innovation as an ontogenetic process. On 
the other hand, if we find the point of departure of our reflection in the process of the creation 
of the innovation outcome that at the same time threatens to destruct the established order, 
we should no longer think the ontogenetic process out of an individual innovation outcome 
that is created while it destructs a previous individual outcome. On the contrary, it should be 
understood out of the process of creation and destruction itself, that is, at the pre-individual 
level. With this, we assume a fundamental difference between outcome and process, between 
individual and pre-individual, thereby keeping open the possibility that innovation as process 
cannot be reduced to innovation as outcome, which is to say that process and outcome are 
divided by a fundamental difference. We shouldn’t take this as an invitation to disregard the 
innovation outcome – it is highly questionable whether we can understand innovations without 
taking this outcome into consideration, for instance because these outcomes only account for 
spatio-temporal differences of their manifestation – but rather as a call to acknowledge both 
outcome and ontogenetic process as two fundamental aspects of innovation.
This acknowledgement of the ontogenetic process of innovation has certain advantages over 
established conceptualizations that find their point of departure in either the human creation as 
input of the innovation process or in the artefact as output of the process. It enables the analysis 
of general patterns in the ontogenesis of innovation, like the process of concretization in which 
innovations initially form an abstract system of isolated parts that function separately – for 
instance a cell-phone with a separate screen and key-board – but becomes increasingly inte-
grated and perfected – for instance the integration of screen and key-board in modern smart-
phones – that cannot be attributed to the subject or object of innovation, but may be associated 
with the ontogenesis of the innovation process as such (see Simondon 2017).
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(b) The Ontic and Ontological Dimension of Innovation
At the level of the innovation outcome, a second difference emerges if we consider that inno-
vations involve something new that intervenes with the established order. If Plato for instance 
argues against innovation because it introduces change in the political order, he is not inter-
ested in the creative destruction of an individual artefact, but in the political order of the world 
that is threatened by innovation and potentially replaced by a new political order.
The dynamic nature of this creation and destruction of the political order becomes clear if 
we ask for the measure or unity of the order of the world. The philosophical tradition starting 
with Plato finds this measure or unity in the ontological characteristic of the being of beings, 
that is, in the transcendental horizon of the Platonic idea. The idea is a fixed category or 
measure, within which the world appears as an ordered whole that makes sense. In light of the 
idea ‘human being’ for instance, various people appear as human beings and we can under-
stand this variety of humans as human beings. The idea human being is itself not a human 
being, but concerns a given measure, category or value within which the variety of people 
appears as unity. In the philosophical tradition there is a fundamental difference between the 
idea, category or value that establishes the order of beings in the world, and these beings them-
selves, which can only be perceived and understood in light of the idea. What is destructed by 
innovation, according to Plato, has to be sought at the ontological level of the idea as measure 
for the established political order, and not at the ontic level of things in the world (Blok 2020).
This also becomes clear in Plato’s Republic. Here, Plato argues that the state should be 
ruled by the philosopher king, who has the necessary training and education that enables him 
to intellectually grasp ethical notions such as the idea of justice, and has the insights that are 
required to safeguard the political order. Here the problem with innovation becomes clear. If 
innovation transgresses the established political order of the world, it primarily intervenes 
at the level of the ideai, categories or values within which the world functions as order. 
Innovations are primarily disrupting the existing ideai, and consist in the human construction 
and introduction of new ideai. This means that the destructive aspect of innovation does not 
concern primarily the ontic level of things in the world, but the ontological level of the ideai, 
categories or values that establish and safeguard a world order. The idea that innovation pri-
marily intervenes at the ontological level of the world order is also confirmed by a later writer 
on innovation, Francis Bacon, who argues that innovations “have altered the whole face and 
state of things right across the globe” (cited in Godin 2015, p. 182; Blok 2020).
Also in modern conceptions of innovation, what is at stake is not primarily the innovation 
of a new artefact from the earliest age to maturity, but the destruction of existing markets and 
construction of new markets for instance (Schumpeter 1943). What is destructed in the inno-
vation of streaming services is not so much the CD in the literal sense of the word – there are 
still CDs in the world – but the way value is created and captured via markets in the economic 
order associated with digital networks like the Internet. What is destructed is not so much an 
artefact, but the political-economic order that is associated with, for instance, water and the 
way in which the water mill and the accompanying textile industry was embedded, which in 
turn gave rise to a new political-economic order associated with steam (railway industry for 
instance), digitalization and so on.
We see here that innovation operates at two levels of outcomes. The innovation of streaming 
services concerns first of all the ontogenesis of this service at an ontic level, but secondly the 
ontogenesis of the political-economic order of the world associated with digital networks 
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at the ontological level. With ‘ontology’, we do not mean an eternal metaphysical idea, but 
a temporary category or value that establishes a particular political-economic order of the 
world – that is, the digital world – that enhances the invention of particular products or services 
– that is, streaming services – while it makes others obsolete – that is, the LP and CD. To the 
extent that innovation does not only concern new artefacts but also the structures within which 
these artefacts appear and are understood as ordered, we think that the distinction between the 
ontic and the ontological level of thinking may be helpful to understand the phenomenon of 
innovation. In the current age, the ontological level of innovation concerns the ontogenesis of 
a world order associated with digital networks, in which the streaming services can emerge, 
can be applied in various software applications and social media, and can be adopted and used 
by humans. This distinction between the ontic and ontological level of the innovation outcome 
provides a new perspective on the nature of innovation. Innovations like the internal combus-
tion engine are innovations at the ontic level of the creation of a new artefact – the first engine 
for instance – but they involve at the same time the destruction of the economic equilibrium or 
world order associated with a particular set of innovations, in this case innovations associated 
with the world of steam. Simultaneously, the innovation of the internal combustion engine 
at an ontic level gives primarily rise to a new world order associated with electricity. The 
innovation outcome therefore doesn’t only concern things in the world, but the world order in 
which these things appear and can be understood (Blok 2020). It is at this ontological level that 
innovation can be said to change the ‘rules of the game’ or the ‘face of the Earth’. We argue 
therefore for a dual concept of the innovation outcome: innovation primarily operates at the 
ontological level of categories that constitute and establish a world, next to its operation at the 
ontic level within this world where it engenders novel things or innovative outcomes.
This duality doesn’t mean that both levels are completely separated. The ontic and ontolog-
ical levels of innovation turn out to be interconnected and interdependent. On the one hand, 
the innovation of the internal combustion engine at the ontic level is dependent on a world 
order associated with electricity. On the other hand, this world of electricity at an ontological 
level emerges only as world order in case of the innovation of the internal combustion engine 
that changes the rules of the game and destructs the world of steam. The innovation of the 
internal combustion engine articulates in a way the condition of its own possibility, namely 
the creation of the world of electricity as a regime in which this combustion engine can only 
function in a proper way and conditions further incremental improvements of this artefact; an 
innovation of the engine that doesn’t take the boundary conditions of the world of electricity 
into account wouldn’t make any sense. The innovation of the world of electricity is ontologi-
cally first, but not necessarily in the temporal sense of the word.
The interdependency of the innovation outcome at ontic and ontological level already pro-
vides good reasons to reject any unilateral focus on either the ontological level of innovation 
– we can think of a Heideggerian onto-centrism that highlights the importance of the ontolog-
ical level of the innovation of a world order while neglecting the ontic level of innovations 
like the Internet, social media and so on – or on the ontic level of innovation – we can think 
of a post-phenomenological approach that highlights how the innovation of Google glass for 
instance mediates the world we experience. Roughly speaking, while Heidegger argues in his 
Question concerning technology that this ontological level of technology cannot be found at 
the level of screws and bolts of an artefact, Verbeek would argue that there is no ontological 
level beyond the screws and bolts of the artefact (Verbeek 2005). In fact, our reflections on 
the innovation outcome compel us to rehabilitate the ontic-ontological difference that was 
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rejected by post-modernist philosophy – for example, Ihde’s idea that there is no Heideggerian 
‘essence’ of technology beyond the many technologies (Ihde 2010) – at least in case we want 
to reflect on the phenomenon of innovation.
This dual concept of innovation has certain advantages over established dichotomies like 
radical and incremental innovation. While the distinction between incremental and radical 
seems to be only a gradual distinction that doesn’t make clear what criterion has to be fulfilled 
for an innovation in order to be called radical, our conceptualization of the ontic and ontolog-
ical level of innovation helps to operationalize this distinction; while incremental innovation 
concerns innovations only at an ontic level – a new version of the iPhone – radical innovation 
concerns innovations both at the ontic and ontological level which involves both the innova-
tion of the steam engine and of the world of steam.
In Table 20.1, we summarize the findings of our reflection in this section. We first distin-
guished between the process and outcome dimension of innovation and then between the ontic 
and ontological dimension of innovation. These dimensions provide two axes that enable us 
to distinguish four characteristics of innovation, namely innovation as innovation outcome at 
the ontic level, like the innovation of streaming services; innovation as innovation outcome at 
the ontological level, like the political-economic order of the world – that is, the digital world 
– associated with digital networks in our current age; innovation as innovation process at the 
ontic level, like the process in which streaming services evolve out of predecessors (LPs, CDs) 
and the existing retail market for CDs is destructed and replaced; innovation as innovation 
process at the ontological level, like the process in which the digital world evolves out the 
world of petrochemicals and electricity (Blok 2020). A full understanding of the phenomenon 
of innovation encompasses these four characteristics of innovation.
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE NEWNESS, THE TEMPORALITY 
AND THE HUMAN INVOLVEMENT IN INNOVATION
These four characteristics of the phenomenon of innovation have several implications for our 
understanding of the object of innovation and the novelty involved, as well as for the tempo-
rality and human creativity involved in innovation practices.
In the previous section, we introduced a dual concept of the innovation outcome at the ontic 
and ontological level while traditionally, innovation is located on the ontic level of new arte-
facts, ranging from computers to nanotechnological instruments. We broadened our perspec-
tive to the innovation of a world order, that is, the innovation of a unifying principle in light of 
which the world appears as order, in which the innovation of particular artefacts can emerge. 
Such a unifying principle may be found in a new material resource or element – for example, 
electricity, steam, digitalization – that articulates for instance the digital world as condition for 
the possibility of the invention and use of new artefacts like sensing or blockchain technolo-
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gies that establish the digital world, but also in new concepts and new meanings of concepts 
like	freedom,	rationality	and	so	on	(Godin	2015,	pp.	30‒1).
The outcome of the innovation process is traditionally seen as the new. Newness can 
be seen as one of the key distinguishing factors between technology and innovation (Blok 
2020); technology is associated with a type of knowledge which is contrasted with disruptive 
innovations which are associated with the un-known and concerns something new to the 
world. At the same time, newness and innovation are two separate things. On the one hand, 
everything we encounter in the world today was once new. On the other hand, the newness of 
many innovations we encounter in the world can be questioned and rather concern changes or 
improvements of what is already available in the world. This observation does not necessarily 
lead to the rejection of newness as distinguishing characteristic of innovation, but makes clear 
why a further reflection on the newness involved in innovation is needed.
The newness of the innovation outcome is not restricted to something new to the world, like 
the first combustion engine or the first flat screen TV as we have seen. Already in the literature 
on innovation management, a distinction is made between innovations that are new to the 
world and innovations that are only new to the firm. All kinds of gradual differences between 
categories of new products are acknowledged, ranging from improvement to repositioning and 
from incremental innovations to disruptive innovations (Christensen 1997). In the literature on 
invention for instance, innovations are seen as combinations or recombinations of things that 
already exist, or even a revisit of ancient things (Godin 2019). Also, from a historical perspec-
tive, we have to put the newness of the innovation outcome between brackets.
The concept of innovation originates from Ancient Greece, where it is named kainotomia. 
Kainotomia means change or the introduction of something new. It comes from kainon (new) 
and tom (cut, cutting) and originally meant ‘cutting fresh into’. It was originally used in the 
context of the opening of new mines (Godin 2015, p. 19). Although Plato for instance is 
opposed to innovation because its newness disrupts the political order and can lead to revolu-
tion, the newness of innovation is often understood as renewal or reformation of the original; 
re-newal stresses newness as return to or as a taking back into an original situation (Godin 
2015). This shows that the outcome of innovation is in first instance not something completely 
new to the world without any predecessor, as is sometimes said in case of disruptive innova-
tions like the Internet, the combustion engine etc. The innovation outcome is the product of 
a historical process of renewal, in which this outcome emerges out of a previous stage and 
remains embedded in it in its future development. The innovation outcome may therefore 
consist in a repetition of an original state, or in the transformation of the current state (renova-
tion) or in the renewal in a completely new state. 
Such an ambiguous conceptualization of the new in innovation is problematic only if we 
conceptualize innovation based on its outcome on the ontic level. Then we are looking for 
a unique characteristic of the innovative product or service as outcome of innovation that 
didn’t exist before and can be protected via patents. Such a unique characteristic will always 
remain contestable however if we acknowledge that all innovations emerge and evolve out of 
a previous historical stage and remain embedded in it. How to decide for instance whether the 
computer is new to the world or the combination of a typewriter and a TV?
Seen from the perspective of our earlier reflections on innovation as process, however, 
we can conceptualize the new in terms of the process of repetition, renovation, renewal, 
revolution and so on. The new then concerns the process of repetition, renovation, renewal 
that characterizes the ontogenetic process from pre-individual to individual, and that results 
Vincent Blok - 9781789902303
Downloaded from Elgar Online at 12/24/2021 12:13:42PM
via Wageningen University
Philosophical reflections on the concept of innovation 361
in an innovation outcome that is revolutionary – it overthrows the established world order 
and is initiates a new beginning of a new world order. This newness of the world concerns 
a new organizing principle – the digital world – that co-evolves with artefacts that establish 
this world – sensing technologies, blockchain technologies, artificial intelligence and so on 
– that could not be expected or anticipated from the worlds that were before; in the world of 
electricity, innovations like blockchain could not yet be imagined. Innovations concern the 
absolute new beginning of a world that cannot be expected upfront but that is not detached 
from history but remain embedded in the temporal dimension of past, present and future. Seen 
from the perspective of the ontogenetic process of innovation, the newness of the innovation 
outcome consists in its break with the past (discontinuity) on the one hand, which remains 
embedded in the history it emerges from (continuity) in its future development on the other. In 
this respect, we can conceptualize the new involved in innovation in terms of the unexpected 
and un-known that cannot be calculated upfront, but is an eruption that is born in a world and 
that constitutes a world.
With this, we receive a further characteristic of the innovation process. The new that is at 
stake in the process of innovation is characterized by iterability (cf. Derrida 1982), that is, by 
the paradoxical simultaneity of sameness and otherness. Or framed in terms of the ontogenetic 
process: to the extent that innovations always remain embedded in the history they emerge 
from, the ‘new’ of innovation is always less than itself (pre-individual) and to the extent that 
the ‘new’ of innovation always involves a break with this past and is on its way to a possible 
future, it is always more than itself (post-individual). We see here that the ambiguous notion 
of newness is less problematic if we conceive it from the perspective of the process of innova-
tion. The new as outcome of innovation is not only not a unique characteristic of this outcome 
but embedded in an iterative process of repetition and renewal. With this, the new is also not 
created ex nihilo or ‘out of the blue’ but determined by the temporal dimension of innovation 
it emerges from as ontogenetic process; the new is the individual outcome of the innovation 
process at the pre-individual level, that is, conditioned by (temporal) iterability.
The idea of the new as outcome of the innovation process at a pre-individual level seems 
to be at odds with two of the fundamental assumptions in contemporary thinking about inno-
vation: (1) that innovation is not so much the outcome of a historical process, but the product 
of human creativity; (2) that human actors at an individual level are the subject of innovation. 
According to Schumpeter for instance, the innovator is a very special type of disruptive 
person. Also, the OECD and the EU see the human actor (businessmen, entrepreneur) as the 
primary subject of innovation.3
Seen from the perspective of the history of innovation, however, it is not self-evident that 
the human actor is the subject of innovation in this double sense of the word. In the ancient and 
medieval reflections on innovation, the human actor is not yet seen as the subject of innova-
tion, nor necessarily as the creator of innovation (Godin 2015, p. 66). Seen from the Platonic 
perspective we discussed before, the human construction of a new idea should be rejected, 
first, because the transcendent world of the ideai is fixed and eternal and cannot be replaced 
by new ones according to Plato. Second, human being does not consist in the construction of 
new ideai (we can associate this with the vita activa), but should be enabled to grasp the eternal 
ideai to safeguard the political order in light of this idea (we can associate this with the vita 
contemplativa) (Blok 2020).
Also in case of Machiavelli for instance, the human actor is not yet seen as the subject of 
innovation. Not human being is the initiator of the innovation process, but time itself; time is 
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seen as corrupting the established world order that calls for innovation as intervention to with-
stand this corruption (Blok 2020). A similar idea can be found in the work of Francis Bacon: 
“Surely every medicine is an innovation; and he that will not apply new remedies, must expect 
new evils; for time is the greatest innovator; and if time of course alter things to the worse, 
and wisdom and counsel shall not alter them to the better, what shall be the end?” (cited in 
Bontems 2014, p. 43). Time itself is seen here as innovator, namely destructing the established 
world order, that at the same time calls for innovations that withstand this corruption and 
construct and safeguard a newly established world order.
Seen from this perspective, we can conceptualize the destructive dimension of innovation 
as entropic aspect of the innovation process, while the creative dimension of innovation can be 
conceived as a negentropic aspect of the innovation process.4 To be sure, it is not the case that 
time is entropic, and innovation is negentropic; the ontogenetic process of innovation is both 
characterized by an entropic aspect and a negentropic aspect at the pre-individual level, where 
the interplay of entropy and negentropy constitutes new individual innovation outcomes. The 
confrontation between the entropic and negentropic aspect of the innovation process makes 
clear that the temporal iterability of the innovation process cannot be understood in a chron-
ological way. While the initiation of the innovation outcome could still be understood in 
a chronological way, namely as embedded in the history it emerges from and the futural state 
toward which it develops, the entropic and negentropic dimensions of the temporal iterability 
of the innovation process show that the initiation of the new (innovation outcome) is temporal 
but can no longer be understood in a chronological way.5
We continue to ask for the role of the human actor in the ontogenetic process of creating the 
‘new’. Although our findings regarding the innovation process indicate a decentralization of 
the (human) subject, this doesn’t imply that the human actor has no role anymore in the inno-
vation process. In ancient times already, innovation is associated with changes by humans, 
as opposed to changes by God (Godin 2015); the innovator is the one who intervenes in the 
established political order, who is a violator of boundaries and a dissenter (Godin 2015). And 
although empirical research on the question whether opportunities for new innovations are 
objective or not is still inconclusive (cf. Kirzner 1997), it is nowadays assumed that opportu-
nities for innovation emerge in the structural interrelation between ‘subjective perception’ and 
‘objective realities’ (Gregoire et al. 2010; cf. Ploum et al. 2017). Also in the sociological liter-
ature on innovation systems, the co-constructive role of the human actor is highlighted (Geels 
2005). So although the human actor is not the primary subject of innovation, he is definitely 
included in the innovation process and has a role in it. How do we have to conceptualize the 
involvement of human being in the innovation process?
Let’s turn to the history of innovation for a moment to receive an answer to this question. In 
the Bible for instance, we encounter innovation in terms of the metamorphosis of human exist-
ence that is needed according to Paulus, the renewal of the spirit in becoming Christian (Godin 
2015). When Paulus for instance calls for a renewal of the spirit to become a true Christian, he 
doesn’t call primarily for a change in our actual behaviour, but for a change of our identity as 
humans, namely, to become a true Christian. Also in other ancient sources, innovation is asso-
ciated with ‘renewing the soul’ (Godin 2015, p. 217). A first sense of the human includedness 
in the innovation process emerges if we consider that the identity of human being can be the 
object of innovation.
A second sense of inclusion emerges if we consider such a metamorphosis to the Christian 
as ontogenesis of this innovation outcome. In this case, the idea of human being as Christian 
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is the outcome of the innovation process. But this implies that human being as Christian is 
not the subject of innovation. To the extent that human being as Christian is an individual 
outcome of the innovation process, the role of human agency in the innovation process has to 
be conceived at a pre-individual level; the human actor that is involved in the metamorphosis 
to human being as Christian (individual innovation outcome) is himself not a Christian yet, but 
underway to a possible futural state in this ontogenetic process (pre-individual). To the extent 
that the metamorphosis to the Christian only succeeds with a certain human co-creation at the 
pre-individual level to be constituted at the individual level, human existence is involved in the 
ontogenetic process of innovation.
This human co-creation in the innovation process is not only at stake in case humans are the 
object of innovation, that is, in case of a renewal of the soul. In fact, human being is always 
already involved in the innovations that establish the world order. Why? The innovation of the 
steam engine changes not only the order of things in the world (the emergence of textile indus-
try). To the extent that human being is always already intentionally involved in a meaningful 
world (Heidegger 2008), the innovation of the steam engine includes at the same time our 
human responsiveness to the world of steam, as user, adopter, operator, disseminator and so on 
of this innovation. The innovations that establish a new world order concern the human-world 
relation as a whole.
Seen from this perspective, human being is not only the co-creator in the ontogenetic 
process of innovation at the pre-individual ontic level, but also the outcome of this process, 
namely as the adopter and disseminator of this innovation within the newly established world 
order at an individual ontic level, for instance as early adopter (Rogers 1962).6 This means that 
human agency occurs at two places in the ontogenetic process of innovation:
(1) Human being can be seen as involved in the ontogenetic process as pre-individual 
co-creator that contributes to the innovation outcome. In the context of this chapter, we 
can conceptualize the human co-creativity at the pre-individual level only in a negative 
way: a) human co-creativity has to be thought at the pre-individual ontic level, and not 
at the level of the individual input (human as subject) or the output (human as adopter) 
level of this process; b) human co-creativity at a pre-individual ontic level contributes 
to the ontogenetic process at pre-individual ontological level, and has to be understood 
therefore out of the ontogenesis of the new. This leaves open the question how the 
co-creativity of human being at the pre-individual level has to be conceived in a positive 
way.7 
(2) Human being can be seen as involved in the outcome of the ontogenetic process as 
adopter of the innovation that establishes a new world order. The new world order is 
only established thanks to the human adoption and dissemination of this innovation. 
This contribution doesn’t make him the subject of innovation either, because this contri-
bution primarily consists in the adoption of the innovation.
This double role of human being in innovation opens a new perspective on the classical idea 
that innovation is the creation of something new and its adoption by the market. While creation 
as such may still be associated with art, innovation is at stake if the creative act of innovation is 
accompanied by its adoption. Here, we see these two aspects of innovation represented in the 
two roles of human being at the individual and the pre-individual level. The question remains 
how the two roles of human agency as co-creator in the innovation process and as adopter are 
related to each other.
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Table 20.2 Four characteristics of the phenomenon of innovation and its implications 
for the novelty, temporality and human involvement in innovation practices
 Ontic level Ontological level
Innovation Outcome Individual innovation outcome at an ontic level: 
‘new’ individual components and compositions of 
components in individual products or services, like 
the innovation of streaming services, and human 
being as adopter of these innovation outcomes.
Individual innovation outcome at an ontological 
level: a ‘new’ political-economic world order, like 
the one associated with digital networks, which 
accompanies the emergence of new products and 
services within this new world order, like streaming 
services.
Innovation Process Ontogenetic process at pre-individual ontic level, in 
which innovation outcomes like steaming services 
emerge iteratively out of predecessors, in which the 
human co-creative capacity is involved.
Ontogenetic process at pre-individual ontological 
level, in which for example the digital world evolves 
out of the negentropic (creative) and entropic 
(destructive) dimension of temporal iterability, and 
in which the human co-creative capacity is involved. 
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In Table 20.2, we summarize the findings of our philosophical reflections on the concept of 
innovation in this section, and its implications for our understanding of the object of innovation 
and the novelty involved, as well as the temporality and human involvement in innovation.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we challenged the techno-economic paradigm of our understanding of 
innovation, building on earlier work (Blok 2020, 2021), in order to articulate a philosophy 
of innovation. We opened up the phenomenon of innovation by distinguishing between the 
innovation process and outcome dimension and between the ontic and ontological dimension 
of innovation.
We showed that established theories of innovation in economics and business administra-
tion often focus on the innovation outcome, which enables to distinguish between incremental 
and radical innovation, while they omit particular reflections on the nature of the innovation 
process itself. Contrary to theories of innovation that conceptualize the process of innovation 
based on its outcome, for instance the distinction between closed and open innovation, we 
articulated the ontogenetic process of innovation in this chapter. The first contribution of the 
philosophy of innovation is the alternative conceptualization of the innovation process as 
a pre-individual ontogenetic process. It helps alternative theories of innovation to criticize the 
superficial conceptualization of innovation processes in stage-gate and technology assessment 
models, and enables us to reflect on the innovation process of creation and destruction as dis-
tinct from the innovation outcome. We provided the example of the process of concretization 
at stake in innovation that cannot be attributed to the input or output of innovation.
We also showed that established theories of innovation often focus on the innovation 
outcome at an ontic level – for example the iPhone or the steam engine – while they omit to 
reflect on the world order involved – for example the world of steam – that is for instance 
destructed by the invention of the internal combustion engine and creates for instance the 
world of electricity. This is strange, as we have seen that economists like Schumpeter already 
indicated the role of economic waves in innovation, while other disciplines indicated the role 
of structural socio-technical changes. The second contribution of the philosophy of innovation 
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consists in a philosophical perspective on the role of waves and changes in innovation, and in 
an alternative conceptualization of the innovation outcome as a combination of an outcome at 
the ontic and ontological level; the innovation of the steam engine requires the innovation of 
the world of steam, while it at the same time establishes this world of steam. This dual concept 
of the innovation outcome helps to criticize the often naïve and superficial conceptualization 
of the innovation outcome as incremental or radical innovations, and enables alternative 
theories of innovation to take the innovation outcome at the ontological level into account in 
further theoretical developments. With this, we also contribute to contemporary debates in 
philosophy of technology, which focus on either the ontic or ontological level of innovation 
and technology, while we highlighted the interdependency and interconnectedness of the ontic 
and ontological level of technology and innovation.
The third contribution of the philosophy of innovation is the provision of a criterion to 
distinguish between incremental and radical innovation. While this distinction in innovation 
theory is criticized because it seems to be conventional or at least arbitrary, we propose a clear 
criterion based on the philosophy of innovation: incremental innovations concern innovations 
at an ontic level only, while radical innovations concern innovations which involve both the 
ontic and ontological level.
We then sketched several implications of the philosophy of innovation for our understand-
ing of the object of innovation and the novelty involved, as well as for the temporality and 
human involvement in innovation practices. If innovation concerns an ontogenetic process in 
which primarily a world is constituted – that is, the digital world – in which the invention of 
new artefacts – that is, an Artificial Intelligence application – is embedded, we should consider 
new developments from this perspective. We should primarily ask for the world order that 
may be created by these new types of innovation, and how these innovations challenge our 
current way of living together in the world. The advantage of our philosophy of innovation is 
that it enables future research to broaden its perspective from the ontic level of the innovation 
outcome of individual innovations to the ontological level of the political-economic world 
order that is created and destructed by these new types of innovation.
Although we have seen that the innovation outcome can be seen as something new, the 
newness involved in innovation is not so much associated with the innovation outcome at an 
ontic level, as it is here that the newness of new artefacts can always be questioned. On the 
contrary, it is primarily connected with the new world order that it establishes. This new world 
order is not the product of a creation ex nihilo, but remains embedded in the historical process 
in which it emerges as repetition, renewal, reformation, revolution; it overthrows the estab-
lished world order and initiates a new beginning of a new world order. In this respect, the new 
involved in innovation practices concerns an absolute new beginning of a world that cannot be 
expected upfront (discontinuity), but is not detached from history and remains embedded in the 
temporal dimension of past, present and future (continuity). This ontogenetic process doesn’t 
follow a chronological temporal order, but is constituted by a temporal iterative process. The 
fourth contribution of the philosophy of innovation is that it moves beyond the traditional 
opposition between linear and circular innovation models in innovation management, and 
highlights the iterability or simultaneity of sameness and otherness involved in innovation. It 
also moves beyond the traditional idea of human being as creative actor and primary subject of 
innovation and highlights the human involvement in the temporal iterability of this ontogenetic 
process of historical development itself, in which the established world order is overthrown 
(entropy) and a new beginning of a new world order is initiated (negentropy). Human creativ-
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ity is involved in this ontogenetic process as co-creative capacity, namely human identity as 
an ontological outcome of innovation and at the same time human identity as pre-individual 
involvement in the process of innovation. The advantage of the philosophy of innovation is 
that it enables future research to broaden its perspective from the human actor as creator and 
subject of innovation to the world building capacity of human being, as it is conceptualized in 
the philosophical tradition (Arendt 1958).
The potential strengths of our philosophy of innovation consists in its ability to move 
beyond the techno-economic paradigm and to broaden our perspective on the phenomenon 
of innovation. Although much more dedicated research is needed to analyse its advantages 
and disadvantages in the context of contemporary developments like social, sustainable and 
responsible innovation, the philosophical reflections on the concept of innovation we devel-
oped in this chapter provide already clear contributions to the further development of our 
understanding of this challenging phenomenon. It also enables dedicated reflections on the 
ethics of innovation beyond the techno-economic paradigm, that concentrate on innovation as 
human ethos (Blok 2018).
NOTES
1. In the philosophical tradition, ontogenesis refers to the process in which not a new being – e.g. 
a particular computer – emerges, but the being of this new being – e.g. the invention of the first 
computer, which involved the first computer both at an ontic and an ontological level – emerges.
2. Parts of this section are earlier published in Blok (2021).
3. This also explains the huge amounts of public investments in entrepreneurship education both in the 
developed and developing world, support of start-ups at technical universities, etc.
4. Negentropy is defined as the opposite of entropy, and means that the innovation process not 
only destructs the established world order (entropy), but also constructs a new established order 
(negentropy).
5. The further reflection on the temporal dimension of the ontogenetic process of innovation is beyond 
the scope of this chapter because the temporality of innovation is not a reinvention of the old (chron-
ological time) and requires a new philosophy of history, in which no longer a dualism between an 
active human creator and a passive materiality of the Earth is at stake, but both are interdependent 
and interconnected.
6. This idea philosophically substantiates the findings of Gabriel Tarde, who associates innovation not 
so much with invention and more with its adoption (cf. Tarde 1903).
7. It is this type of reflections on the nature of human co-creation, that are completely omitted in 
scientific literature on user-led innovations for instance (cf. von Hippel 2005).
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